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Consent To Harm
Vera Bergelson
Abstract
This article continues conversation about consent to physical harm started in Vera
Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 165 (2007).
Intentionally injuring or killing another person is presumptively wrong. To over-
come this presumption, the perpetrator must establish a defense of justification.
Consent of the victim may serve as one of the grounds for such a defense. This
article puts forward criteria for the defense of consent.
One element of the proposed defense is essential to both its complete and par-
tial forms ¨C that consent of the victim be rational and voluntary. In addition,
for complete justification, the perpetrator¡¯s reasons for a consensual injurious act
should be subjectively benevolent and the act must produce an overall positive
balance of harms and evils, including harm to the victim¡¯s welfare interests and
dignity. If these requirements are not met, the defense should be only partial.
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Consent To Harm 
Vera Bergelson* 
The case of People v. Jovanovic, dubbed by tabloids the 
“cybersex torture” case,1 began in November 1996, when Jamie 
Ruzcek, a twenty-year-old Barnard student, reported to the 
police that she had been sexually assaulted by Oliver 
Jovanovic, a thirty-year-old doctoral candidate at Columbia 
University.2  The alleged assault happened during the first 
“live” date between Jovanovic and Ruzcek, which took place 
after weeks of their on-line conversations and e-mail 
correspondence.3  According to Ruzcek, “Jovanovic had hogtied 
her for nearly twenty hours, violently raped and sodomized her, 
struck her repeatedly with a club, severely burned her with 
candle wax, and repeatedly gagged her with a variety of 
materials.”4  
Jovanovoic was prosecuted, convicted of kidnapping, 
sexual abuse and assault, and sentenced to a term of 15 years 
* Professor of Law, Robert E. Knowlton Scholar, Rutgers School of Law-
Newark; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., Institute of Slavic and 
Balkan Studies at the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union.  This article 
is based, in part, and continues the discussion started in Vera Bergelson, The 
Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
165 (2007) (hereinafter, The Right to Be Hurt).  It will be also published, 
substantially in the same form, as a chapter in a multi-authored book, THE 
ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Alan Wertheimer & Franklin G. 
Miller eds., 2009). I am grateful to the participants of the Victims and 
Criminal Justice System symposium at Pace Law School for their thoughtful 
comments, and to the deputy director of Rutgers Law Library Paul Axel-Lute 
and my research assistant Linda Posluszny for their massive help in 
researching this project. 
1. Jovanovic v. City of New York, No. 04-8437, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
59165, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2006). 
2. Id. at *4. 
3. People v. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159 (App. Div. 1999).  
4. Jovanovic, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59165, at *4. 
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to life.5  He was released after twenty months in prison when 
the appellate court ruled that the trial judge improperly denied 
admission of portions of Ruzcek’s e-mails to Jovanovic, in which 
she discussed her sadomasochistic interests and experience.6  
The court explained: “Because the jury could have inferred 
from the redacted e-mail messages that the complainant had 
shown an interest in participating in sadomasochism with 
Jovanovic, this evidence is clearly central to the question of 
whether she consented to the charged kidnapping and sexual 
abuse.”7  Since non-consent is an element of both offenses—
kidnapping and sexual abuse—the appellate court properly 
reversed Jovanovic’s convictions on both charges.  But the court 
did not stop there; it also reversed Jovanovic’s conviction of 
assault in the second- and third- degree. 
Under New York law, a person is guilty of second-degree 
assault when, “[w]ith intent to cause physical injury to another 
person, he causes such injury to such person . . . by means of a 
deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.”8  A person is guilty 
of third-degree assault when “[w]ith intent to cause physical 
injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person . 
. . .”9  Neither statutory provision lists the lack of consent as an 
element to be proven by the prosecution or allows for the 
defense of consent.  And yet the appellate court did something 
quite remarkable: it reversed the assault conviction and at the 
same time (albeit in a footnote only) reiterated the traditional 
rule that “[t]here is no available defense of consent on a charge 
of assault. . . .”10  The court elaborated: 
Indeed, while a meaningful distinction can be made 
between an ordinary violent beating and violence in 
which both parties voluntarily participate for their 
own sexual gratification, nevertheless, just as a 
person cannot consent to his or her own murder, as a 
matter of public policy, a person cannot avoid criminal 
responsibility for an assault that causes injury or 
5. Id. at *9. 
6. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 159.. 
7. Id. at 168.. 
8. N.Y. Penal Law § 120.05(2) (McKinney 2006). 
9. N.Y. Penal Law § 120.00(1) (McKinney 2004). 
10. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 169 n.5. 
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carries a risk of serious harm, even if the victim asked 
for or consented to the act.11 
In his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
Judge Mazzarelli pointed out the obvious discrepancy between 
the majority’s holding (consent is not a defense to assault) and 
decision (reversal of the assault conviction).12  He also opined 
that the evidence produced at the trial was sufficient to support 
the defendant’s conviction of assault,13 and the majority did not 
dispute that conclusion.14  Technically, Judge Mazzarelli was 
right, and the majority was wrong.  The decision defied both 
formal logic and the established rule, according to which 
consent to assault, including private sadomasochistic activities, 
could not exculpate the perpetrator.15 
However, from the perspective of fairness and internal 
consistency of criminal sanctions, the Jovanovic appellate 
decision was more justifiable than the current rule of law.  
Consider this: assuming Jovanovic indeed caused Ruzcek a lot 
of pain and anguish, why should her consent shield him from 
criminal liability for sexual violence and kidnapping, but not 
for assault?  Clearly, this is not because rape or kidnapping is a 
11. Id. (citations omitted). 
12. Id. at 174 (Mazzarelli, J.P., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
13. Id.  Judge Mazzarelli wrote: 
[T]he complaining witness's testimony was sufficient to support both of 
these convictions, and, in the circumstances, hot candle wax was 
appropriately considered a dangerous instrument. Moreover, the 
complainant’s testimony was corroborated by a neighbor who heard 
sounds as if someone were “undergoing root canal” from defendant’s 
apartment at the time in question, by the complaining witness's prompt 
outcries to five individuals, some of these individuals' observations of 
the complaining witness's injuries, the lab results as to her clothing, 
and the e-mails sent between the complaining witness and defendant 
subsequent to the incident. 
Id. at 175 (citations omitted). 
14. See, e.g., id. at 198 n.5 (majority opinion) (accepting the jury finding 
that the victim was physically injured during her encounter with the 
defendant). 
15. See, e.g., People v. Samuels, 58 Cal. Rptr. 439, 513-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1967); State v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 303, 305-07 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); 
Commonwealth v. Appleby, 402 N.E.2d 1051, 1059-61 (Mass. 1980); State v. 
Van, 688 N.W.2d 600, 613-15 (Neb. 2004); R v. Emmett, [1999] EWCA (Crim) 
1710 (Eng.); R v. Brown, [1992] 2 All E.R. 552 (A.C.); R v. Donovan, (1934) 2 
Eng. Rep. 498, 503 (K.B.). 
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less serious offense than assault.  In fact, a person in danger of 
being raped or kidnapped has the right to use any physical 
force, including deadly force, to protect him or herself against 
that danger, whereas a person in danger of a simple assault 
does not have the same right.  And yet, consent of the victim 
“turns a rape into love-making, a kidnapping into a Sunday 
drive, a battery into a football tackle, a theft into a gift, and a 
trespass into a dinner party,”16 but, except in a couple of 
narrowly defined circumstances, it is powerless to change the 
moral and legal character of assault. 
I.  The Origins and Current Boundaries of the Rule of Consent 
Historically, the special rule of consent to physical harm 
originated in Anglo-American jurisprudence in the 17th 
century.  Prior to that, an individual was free to consent 
practically to anything, and consent was viewed as a complete 
ban on prosecution.  As the famous maxim goes, volenti non fit 
injuria: “a person is not wronged by that to which he 
consents.”17  Changes came as a result of the monopolization of 
the system of punishment by the state.  While in the early ages 
of criminal justice the victim was the central figure in the 
prosecution and settlement of any nonpublic offense,18 in the 
normative and centralized judicial structure the victim became 
almost entirely excluded from the criminal process.19  “In 
contrast to the understanding of crime as a violation of the 
victim’s interest, the emergence of the state developed another 
16. Heidi M. Hurd, Blaming the Victim: A Response to the Proposal that 
Criminal Law Recognize a General Defense of Contributory Responsibility, 8 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 503, 504 (2005). 
17. See Terence Ingman, A History of the Defence of Volenti Non Fit 
Injuria, 26 JURID. REV. 1, 8-9 (1981). 
18. See HARRY ELMER BARNES & NEGLEY K. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN 
CRIMINOLOGY 342 (2d ed. 1951) (explaining that public offenses were those 
that exposed a “group to spiritual or human enemies, particularly the 
former”).  “Crimes against persons were not controlled by the tribe or the 
family but by the clan under the principle of blood feud.”  Id. 
19. See Clarence Ray Jeffery, The Development of Crime in Early 
English Society, 47 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 647, 662 (1957) 
(“By 1226 an agreement between the criminal and the relatives of a slain 
man would not avail to save the murderer from an indictment and a sentence 
of death.  The state no longer allowed a private settlement of a criminal 
case.”). 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art46
BERGELSON-COCEPTUALIZING CONSENT (FOR SSRN).DOC 7/17/2008  4:21 PM 
2008] CONSENT TO HARM 105 
 
interpretation: the disturbance of the society.”20  An increasing 
number of historically “private” offenses were reconceptualized 
as “public.”21  The state (or king) became the ultimate victim 
and the sole prosecutor of a criminal act.22  Consequently, an 
individual lost the power to consent to what the state regarded 
as harm to itself. 
In one of the earliest English cases that rejected consent of 
the victim as a defense to serious bodily harm, the court opined 
that the defendant was guilty because, by maiming the willing 
victim, he deprived the king of the aid and assistance of one of 
his subjects.23  Three centuries later, an American court used a 
very similar argument, explaining that the “commonwealth 
needs the services of its citizens quite as much as the kings of 
England needed the services of theirs.”24 
Today, American law continues to maintain that one’s life 
and body do not quite belong to him.  Accordingly, an 
individual has a very limited power to authorize an act that 
affects his physical well-being.  For example, the Model Penal 
Code (“MPC”) views consent of the victim as a defense “if such 
consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the 
infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law 
defining the offense.”25  This general rule, however, does not 
apply to offenses involving bodily harm.  In those cases, 
consent of the victim exonerates the perpetrator only in three 
sets of circumstances: (i) when the injury is not serious;26 (ii) 
when the injury or its risk are “reasonably foreseeable hazards” 
of participation in a “lawful athletic contest or competitive 
sport or other concerted activity not forbidden by law;”27 and 
20. STEPHEN SCHAFER, VICTIMOLOGY: THE VICTIM AND HIS CRIMINAL 22 
(1977). 
21. By the eighteenth century, all crimes and misdemeanors were 
regarded as public wrongs.  See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *5 
(explaining that “public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanours, are a breach 
and violation of the public rights and duties due to the whole community. . . 
.”).  
22. See id. at *5-6. 
23. Id. at *205. 
24. State v. Bass, 120 S.E.2d 580, 586 (N.C. 1961). 
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(1) (1980). 
26. Id. at § 2.11(2)(a). 
27. Id. at § 2.11(2)(b). 
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(iii) when the bodily harm was inflicted for the purpose of a 
“recognized form of treatment” intended to improve the 
patient’s physical or mental health.28 
This limited rule, which reflects the law in the absolute 
majority of states,29 has been criticized for its narrow scope and 
arbitrary boundaries. As one judge remarked, it is “very 
strange that a fight in private between two youths where one 
may, at most, get a bloody nose should be unlawful, whereas a 
boxing match where one heavyweight fighter seeks to knock 
out his opponent and possibly do him very serious damage 
should be lawful.”30  Examples of the law’s arbitrariness are 
abundant.  Consider just a few. 
1.  Familial Breast Cancer Syndrome, Body Integrity 
Identity Disorder, and Gender Identity Disorder 
A woman who carries a breast cancer gene may choose to 
have a preventive mastectomy.31  Such radical surgery, 
28. Id. at §§ 2.11(2)(c), 3.08(4)(a). 
29. Thirteen states explicitly recognize a general defense of consent in 
their statutes.  See ALA.CODE § 13A-2-7 (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-505 
(2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 451-453 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 702-
233,702-235 (1993) (omits equivalent of subsection (2)(a)); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 109 (2006) (omits equivalent of subsection (3)(c)); VERNON’S 
ANN. MISS. STAT. §565.080;  MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.080 (West 1999); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 45-2-211 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:6 (1996) (omits 
equivalent of subsections (3)(c) and (3)(d)); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-10 (West 
2005) (omits equivalent of subsection (3)(c)); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-08 
(1997) (omits equivalent of subsection (3)(c)); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 311 
(West 1998) (omits equivalent of subsection (2)(a)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
104 (2003) (omits equivalent of subsection (2)(c) and (3)); TEXAS PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 22.06 (Vernon 2003) (omits equivalent of subsection (2)(c) and (3)).  
Other states have incorporated the concept of consent in the Special Part of 
their penal codes, making non-consent an element of an offense or providing 
for the defense of consent with respect to specific crimes.  See, e.g., 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/12-17 (2002) (“It shall be a defense to any offense under Section 
12-13 through 12-16 of this Code [sexual crimes] where force or threat of force 
is an element of the offense that the victim consented.”).  Where the statute 
does not explicitly mention consent, case law usually defines in what 
circumstances consent may function as a defense.  Compare CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 240 (West 1999) (“An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a 
present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.”), with 
People v. Gordon, 11 P. 762, 762 (Cal. 1886) (stating that an attempt made 
with the victim’s consent “will not constitute an assault”). 
30. R. v. Brown, [1994] 1 A.C. 212, 278 (H.L.) (Lord Slynn’s opinion). 
31. See e.g., Jane E. Brody, Personal Health, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1993, at 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art46
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although quite lawful, is considered to be controversial in 
medical literature: there is little proof that, for purposes of 
cancer prevention, it is superior to less extreme and disfiguring 
alternatives.32  For women with “familial breast cancer 
syndrome,” a condition indicating a high risk for developing 
breast cancer,33 the primary advantage of the surgery is that it 
helps to relieve chronic stress and anxiety over the substantial 
likelihood of developing the disease.34 
Yet, considerations of emotional pain fail to legitimize an 
elective surgery on a patient with Body Integrity Identity 
Disorder (“BIID”), a rare ailment whose victims seek to become 
amputees.35  The limited statistics seem to indicate that, if 
BIID patients succeed in their pursuit, their quality of life 
improves dramatically.36  A surgeon who agrees to perform 
such an amputation, however, opens himself up to criminal 
liability because his patients’ consent is legally invalid.37 
The BIID patients often compare themselves to those 
suffering from Gender Identity Disorders (“GID”), describing 
the common experience as “being “stuck in the wrong body.”38  
The law, however, treats the two groups very differently: the 
GID patients can consent to a sex change operation, which 
often involves removal of healthy sex organs,39 whereas the 
C13. 
32. Lane D. Ziegler & Stephen S. Kroll, Primary Breast Cancer After 
Prophylactic Mastectomy, 14 AM. J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 451, 453 (1991) 
(discussing controversial nature of prophylactic mastectomy and comparing it 
with less radical alternatives). 
33. Id. at 452. 
34. See Mal Bebbington Hatcher et al., The Psychosocial Impact of 
Bilateral Prophylactic Mastectomy: Prospective Study Using Questionnaires 
and Semistructured Interviews, 322 BRIT. MED. J. 76  (2001). 
35. Editorial, When It Feels Right to Cut Off Your Leg, GEELONG 
ADVERTISER (Austl.), July 4, 2005, at 15. 
36. Id. 
37. But see Tim Bayne & Neil Levy, Amputees by Choice: Body Integrity 
Identity Disorder and the Ethics of Amputation, 22 J. APPLIED PHIL. 75, 84-85 
(2005) (arguing that, as long as people are legally sane, they should be 
allowed to have their limbs amputated by a surgeon). 
38. Carl Elliot, A New Way to Be Mad, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2000, at 
73-74. 
39. See G.B. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555, 557 (Ct. App. 1978) (stating 
that “[t]he severity of the problem of transsexualism becomes obvious when 
one contemplates the reality of the male transsexual’s desperate desire to 
have normally functioning male genitals removed because the male sex 
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BIID sufferers cannot consent to amputation of an arm or a 
leg.40 
2.  Sadomasochistic Beating, Religious Flagellation, and 
Ritual Mutilation 
According to the current rule of consent, a person may not 
agree to physical injury.  In practically every single case 
involving consensual sadomasochistic beating, the defendant 
was convicted of assault.  In State v. Collier, for example, the 
court held that the legislature did not intend to include 
sadomasochistic encounters in the list of “‘sport, social or other 
activity’” permitted under the Iowa Code.41  Religious 
flagellation, on the other hand, enjoys much more deferential 
treatment by authorities.42  In a 19th century Scottish case, the 
court opined that “[i]n some cases, a beating may be consented 
to as in the case of a father confessor ordering flagellation; but 
this is not violence or assault, because there is consent.”43  
More recently, some courts have said that the law “may 
prohibit religiously impelled physical attacks,”44 but research 
has revealed no actual legal cases.  Some states even include 
the element of non-consent in the definition of ritual 
mutilation.  The Illinois Criminal Code, for instance, provides: 
A person commits the offense of ritual 
mutilation, when he or she mutilates, 
dismembers or tortures another person as part of 
a ceremony, rite, initiation, observance, 
organs are a source of immense psychological distress”). 
40. See Annemarie Bridy, Confounding Extremities: Surgery at the 
Medico-Ethical Limits of Self-Modification, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 148, 148, 
151-55 (2004).  Bridy states that, “[t]o the extent that society and its 
institutions remain committed to a norm of bodily integrity that excludes the 
disabled body, it will remain very difficult to collectively imagine that elective 
amputation could be good medicine for apotemnophiles.”  Id. at 155. 
41. See State v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) 
(quoting IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.1 (West 2003)). 
42. Law Commission, Consultation Paper 139, Consent in the Criminal 
Law 10.1-10.4 (1995). 
43. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
44. United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1496 (D. Wyo. 1995).  
See Ogletree v. State, 440 S.E.2d 732, 733 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (opining that, 
even had the victim consented, the severe beating ordered by a pastor would 
still constitute battery). 
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performance or practice, and the victim did not 
consent or under such circumstances that the 
defendant knew or should have known that the 
victim was unable to render effective consent.45 
The italicized language indicates that if the religious 
mutilation, dismemberment, or torture is done with the 
consent of the victim, such activity should be lawful. 
3.  Consensual Transmission of HIV 
Even though consensual beating constitutes a crime, 
consensual intentional transmission of HIV is most likely not 
punishable in a significant number of states.  The phenomenon, 
known as “bug-chasing,” involves “bug-chasers” (HIV-negative 
men who actively seek out infection by having unprotected sex 
with infected partners) and “gift-givers” (HIV-positive men 
willing to infect “bug-chasers”).  According to a source, this 
practice is the cause of 25 percent of all new infections among 
American gay men.46  These statistics have been questioned, 
but even if they are not entirely accurate, there is a general 
consensus that “bug-chasing” and “gift-giving” present a 
serious problem for the gay community.47  Nevertheless, out of 
twenty-four states that have statutes criminalizing the act of 
knowingly exposing another human being to HIV, eight states 
explicitly recognize consent of the victim as an affirmative 
defense,48 and another ten reach the same outcome by making 
failure to disclose one’s HIV status an element of the crime.49 
Since any harmful act that does not fit into the “athletic” 
or “medical” exception is, by definition, criminal, unless the 
inflicted injury is not serious, assessment of the seriousness of 
45. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-32(a) (West 2005) (emphasis added). 
46. Gregory A. Freeman, Bug Chasers: The Men Who Long to Be HIV+, 
ROLLING STONE, Jan. 23, 2003, available at 
http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/5939950/bug_chasers. 
47. Amanda Weiss, Comment, Criminalizing Consensual Transmission 
of HIV, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 389, 389-90 (2006). 
48. Those states are: Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Nevada, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and Tennessee.  Leslie E. Wolf & Richard Vezina, 
Crime and Punishment: Is There a Role for Criminal Law in HIV Prevention 
Policy?, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 821, 854 (2004). 
49. Those states are: Arkansas, California, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Carolina.  Id. 
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the victim’s injury determines the outcome of many cases 
involving consensual harm.  A typical penal statute classifies 
bodily injury as serious if it “creates a substantial risk of death 
or . . . causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted 
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 
organ.”50  Pursuant to this definition, any short-term, non-life-
threatening injury should not be deemed “serious.”  Yet, as the 
MPC acknowledges, the assessment of the seriousness of harm 
is often affected by judges’ “moral judgments about the iniquity 
of the conduct involved.” 51  Courts tend to inflate the risk and 
harmfulness of an activity they want to denounce.  For 
example, any injury caused during a sadomasochistic 
encounter has been consistently classified as serious. 
In State v. Collier, the victim’s injuries consisted of “a 
swollen lip, large welts on her ankles, wrists, hips, buttocks, 
and severe bruises on her thighs.”52  The defendant was 
convicted of assault resulting in a serious injury, and the 
appellate court agreed, although, as the dissenting judge 
pointed out, the inflicted bodily harm did not constitute a 
serious injury within the meaning of the state statute.53 
Some state penal codes include physical pain in the 
definition of “bodily harm.”54  In State v. Guinn, the defendant 
50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(3) (1980).  Following the Model Penal 
Code,, many states have adopted an identical or similar definition.  See, e.g., 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-1(b) (West 2005); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(46) 
(Vernon 2005). 
51. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11 cmt. 2 n.8 (1980).  The Commentary 
points out that the MPC provision does not explicitly foreclose resort to such 
judgments, though the envisioned emphasis is on the amount of injury itself.  
Id. 
52. State v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985).  See R v. 
Donovan, (1934) 2 Eng. Rep. 498, 502-03 (K.B.) (“seven or eight red marks” 
on the body of a participant of a sadomasochistic encounter found to be 
sufficient for an assault conviction); R v. Emmett, [1999] EWCA (Crim) 1710 
(Eng.) (bloodshot eyes and a burn, which had completely healed by the time 
of the trial, sufficed for an assault conviction of a participant of consensual 
sadomasochistic sex). 
53. Collier, 372 N.W.2d at 309 (Schlegel, J., dissenting). 
54. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(2) (1980); WASH. REV. CODE § 
9A.04.110(4)(a) (2004) (“‘Bodily injury,’ ‘physical injury,’ or ‘bodily harm’ 
means physical pain or injury, illness, or an impairment of physical 
condition.”).  In State v. Guinn, the relevant statute did not define “serious 
physical injury.”  State v. Guinn, No. 23886-1-II, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 
502, at *33 (Ct. App. March 30, 2001).  But “‘substantial bodily harm’” was 
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was convicted of inflicting “serious physical injury” in the 
course of a sexual encounter.55  There was no evidence that the 
victim “‘ever required any medical attention or suffered any 
wounds of any sort.’”56  Yet the appellate court sustained the 
assault conviction, reasoning that the sadomasochistic 
paraphernalia used by the defendant must have caused serious 
physical pain (candle wax was “‘hot and it stung’” and nipple 
clamps were “‘tight and cutting’”),57 and “physical pain” 
satisfied the definition of “physical injury.”58  Naturally, under 
a statute of this type, practically any sadomasochistic activity 
may be characterized as criminal. 
The current rule of consent to harm is problematic on 
many levels: not only is it arbitrary and strict; it is also 
autocratic and absolute.  People are allowed to consent to harm 
only if their activities are on the list of things approved by the 
state.  The law envisions no balancing or accommodation of 
conflicting interests of an individual and society.  The 
disregard for an individual, inherent in this rule, goes against 
the basic principles of autonomy and personal responsibility 
defining American criminal law.  Moreover, the authoritarian 
presumption that it is not an individual, but rather the state 
that is the victim of every crime is plainly wrong because, if 
that were so, then consent would not be a defense to any 
harm.59  Yet we know that individuals are free to consent to all 
kinds of harm—emotional, financial, reputational—as long as 
these harms are not physical. 
defined as “bodily injury which involves a temporary but substantial 
disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ, or which causes a 
fracture of any bodily part.’”  Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.04.110(4)(b) 
(2004)).  And “‘great bodily harm’” was defined as “‘bodily injury which 
creates a probability of death, or which causes significant serious permanent 
disfigurement, or which causes a significant permanent loss or impairment of 
the function of any bodily part or organ.’”  Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE  § 
9A.04.110(4)(c) (2004)). 
55. Guinn, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 502, at *32. 
56. Id. at *34. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime 
and Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 570 (2004) (pointing out that, “if the 
state were indeed the victim of every crime, then consent should be a defense 
to none.”). 
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This critique prompts two questions: one, why do we 
perceive consent to bodily harm so differently than consent to 
any other activity, specifically, why does consent preclude such 
offenses as theft, rape, or kidnapping but not murder or 
battery; and two, if we were to revise the current law of 
consent, where should we draw the line between permissible 
and impermissible bodily harm? 
 
II. Why Consent to Physical Harm is Treated Differently Than 
Consent to Any Other Limitation of Rights 
 
To have a right means to have a certain moral status.  
Consent is a way to change this status unilaterally by 
transferring to another person a claim, privilege, power, or 
immunity.60  For example, by promising a neighbor to sell him 
my car, I give him a claim against me with regard to that 
promise.  By consenting to a root canal procedure, I give my 
dentist a privilege to perform it.  By inviting a friend to dinner, 
I give him a power to visit me.  In all those instances, I waive a 
right I used to have and give other people rights they did not 
have before.  And yet there is an important difference in how 
consent changes the relevant relationship between the parties 
in some of these scenarios. 
Recall the MPC consent provisions.  Under the MPC, 
voluntary consent of a legally competent individual may trigger 
two different rules, either the general rule or the specific rule 
for consent to bodily harm.  We already reviewed the latter; 
now let’s have a closer look at the former.  The MPC general 
rule of consent provides that consent of the victim is a defense 
if it either “negatives an element of the offense or precludes the 
infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law 
defining the offense.”61  What is peculiar in this rule is that 
both grounds for the defense have little to do with the theory of 
defenses. 
Any defense presumes that a criminal act has been 
committed; however, it was committed under the 
60. See generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL 
CONCEPTIONS (1923).  See also JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 
360-61 (1990). 
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(1) (1980) (emphasis added). 
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circumstances that may either justify or excuse the 
perpetrator.  An act is criminal only if it encompasses all 
elements of the offense.  If an element is missing, no defense is 
needed simply because the perpetrator is not guilty even of a 
prima facie criminal wrongdoing.62  For example, each of the 
offenses of rape, kidnapping, and theft includes in its definition 
the element of non-consent.63  If that element is negated by the 
victim’s acquiescence, the defendant is completely exonerated 
by the so-called failure of proof.  In these circumstances, 
consent of the victim does not serve as a defense; instead, it 
defeats the very possibility of an offense. 
The second, alternative ground for the MPC defense of 
consent is also puzzling: on the one hand, it almost verbatim 
repeats a segment of Section 3.02, which summarizes general 
requirements for a defense of justification; on the other hand it 
differs from Section 3.02 in a meaningful way.  Section 3.02 
maintains that conduct is justifiable if “the harm or evil sought 
to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be 
prevented by the law defining the offense charged.”64  The 
italicized words coincide with the language of Section 2.11.  
However, if the general justification provision requires only 
that the inflicted harm or evil be lesser than the harm or evil 
that was avoided, the consent provision talks about complete 
preclusion of any harm or evil that is sought to be prevented by 
the law defining the offense.  The consent provision, thus, 
exculpates the defendant only when social harm is entirely 
avoided.  But if there is no social harm, why should the 
defendant even need a defense?  Isn’t this provision merely a 
broader version of the first part of the section (i.e. negation of 
an element of the offense charged)? 
The materials of the American Law Institute (“ALI”) 
proceedings confirm this supposition.  According to MPC 
Reporter Herbert Wechsler, the alternative ground for relief in 
62. “Justification and excuses do not seek to refute any required element 
of the prosecution’s case; rather they suggest further considerations that 
negate culpability even when all elements of the offense are clearly present.”  
SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SHULHOFER & CAROLE S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL 
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 737 (8th ed. 2007). 
63. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 212.1, 213.1, 223.2 (1980). 
64. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a) (1980) (emphasis added). 
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Section 2.11(1) was intended to cover a situation when the 
definition of an offense, which logically should have 
incorporated the non-consent language, by legislative oversight 
or for some other reason, omitted it: 
There are also cases where in the definition of a crime 
the words “without consent” have not been put in, but 
where it is perfectly clear that in the legislative 
conception of the offense the idea it is intended, and 
that’s the purpose for the rest of part (1), that if 
consent precludes the infliction of the harm or evil 
sought to be prevented by the legislature, then even 
though it doesn’t negative the formal element, it still 
ought to be a defense.65 
In other words, the defense of consent set forth in Section 
2.11(1) of the MPC is not a defense at all.  Instead it is another 
way to state the rule that a person is not guilty of an offense 
unless each element of the offense is proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.66  In that sense, Section 2.11(1) is 
redundant, and the drafters of the MPC have acknowledged 
that by calling it “merely tautological”67 and contrasting it with 
the specific rule of consent to bodily harm stated in 
: 
Now, the second part is more than tautological.  There 
is a real need to indicate when and how far consent 
should be a defense to bodily injury crimes, because 
again you wouldn’t draft a murder statute in terms of 
killing somebody without his consent.  Obviously, the 
idea is that it’s a crime whether he consents or not, 
and how far consent to bodily injur
65. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE 39TH ANNUAL MEETING, 90-91 (1962).  A typical case envisioned by 
the drafters of the MPC would involve damage of property with the owner’s 
consent.  Id. at 91 (“Obviously the whole idea of the crime is misusing 
som
he absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is 
assu
67. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 65, at 
90. 
ebody else’s property.”). 
66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1) (1980) (“No person may be convicted of 
an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  In t
med.”). 
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involves some deep questions of policy.68 
The conceptual imprecision of Section 2.11 would be of 
little interest today had it not reflected an important intuition 
of the MPC drafters apparent in their attempt to differentiate 
between two entirely different roles of consent in criminal law.  
Compare cases of rape, kidnapping, or theft on the one hand, 
and cases of killing or maiming on the other.  In the first group 
of cases, the act itself does not violate a prohibitory norm.  
Having sex, transporting someone to a different location, or 
taking other people’s property is not bad in itself.  It becomes 
bad only due to the absence of consent.  In other words, no 
matter how we draft the statute, in cases of theft, rape, or 
kidnapping the role of consent is inculpatory—non-consent is a 
part of the definition of the offense.69 
In contrast, causing pain, injury, or death is not morally 
neutral; it is regrettable.70  Bringing about a regrettable state 
of events is bad and should be avoided.71  Therefore, the law 
should promote a conduct rule that prohibits the very act of 
killing or hurting, providing, of course, for the necessary 
exceptions, such as self-defense.  However, the fact that a 
person may be legally justified in killing an aggressor does not 
make the killing as morally neutral as borrowing a book—it is 
still regrettable.  It is still regrettable that a dental patient has 
to suffer pain, even though the dentist is justified in causing 
it,72 whereas there is nothing regrettable in consensual sex or 
consensual change of ownership.  To lose or reduce its inherent 
68. Id. at 91. 
69. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 705 (1978); 
Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt, at 202-03.  
70. See, e.g., R v. Brown, [1994] 1 A.C. 212, 250 (H.L.) (Lord Lowry’s 
opinion) (opining that “for one person to inflict any injury on another without 
good reason is an evil in itself (malum in se) and contrary to public policy”). 
71. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: 
HARMLESS WRONGDOING 18 (1988) (defining evil in the most generic sense as 
“any occurrence or state of affairs that is rather seriously to be regretted”). 
72. Peter Westen has correctly pointed out that consent to injury does 
not eliminate its harmfulness.  PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE 
DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL 
CONDUCT 115 (2004) (observing that it would be “patently false to say that a 
person who consents to conduct, e.g., a medical patient who consents to 
surgical amputation of an eye or limb or a breast, suffers no burdens or 
setbacks to her interests of any kind from it.”). 
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deserted cabin and consumed the owner’s provisions, they 
 
wrongfulness, the act
ification. The role of consent here is exculpatory; it may 
only serve as a defense. 
To distinguish a definition from a defense, as George 
Fletcher has insightfully observed, we need to identify a 
prohibitory norm, which “must contain a sufficient number of 
elements to state a coherent moral imperative.”73  In the case 
of killing or inflicting pain, this imperative is quite 
straightforward: do not kill, do not inflict pain.  But what 
conduct rule do we want to convey to the community in cases of 
rape, theft, or criminal mischief?  Should it say: Do not have 
sex?  Do not take other people’s possessions?  Do not break 
other people’s property?  Certainly not.  Even the last rule, the 
most controversial of the three, would be unmerited and 
impracticable.  There is nothing wrong with breaking things.  
People may need to break things, including those belonging to 
others, in the process of construction, repair, cleaning, cooking, 
or just having fun.  We do not want to prohibit useful or 
morally neutral activities.  What we want to prohibit is 
engaging in these activities under the circumstances that make 
such activities wrongful.  Accordingly, the conduct rule 
applicable to killing or hurting does not require the non-
consent language, wh
t, or criminal mischief simply makes no sense without the 
non-consent element. 
In practical terms, this distinction means that consent 
precludes even a prima facie case of rape, theft, or criminal 
mischief, regardless of whether the consensual act brings about 
more good than harm, and regardless of whether the defendant 
is aware of the victim’s consent.  Significantly more is required 
for a successful defense.  Why is that so?  Mainly because we 
view a defense of justification as a limited license to commit an 
otherwise prohibited act in order to achieve a socially and 
morally desirable outcome.74  For instance, if a group of 
mountaineers, caught by a snowstorm, took refuge in a 
73. FLETCHER, supra note 69, at 568. 
74. Id. at 565 (arguing that justification is an exception to a prohibitory 
norm and, as such, should be available only to those who merit special 
treatment). 
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of ha
ry norm in order to achieve this preferable 
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lf-
defe
 defense (immediate necessity to fend off 
an u
her than allow the aggressor to harm an 
inno
would be justified under the defense of necessity.75  This 
limited license is teleological in nature; it presumes an 
objective need, an objectively preferable outcome, and the good 
faith of the actors.  If, say, the mountaineers committed the 
break-in because, in their minds, it was a lesser evil than 
remaining hungry for the next few hours, they would not be 
entitled to the defense.76  Nor would they be justified if the 
reason for breaking in was a desire to have an impromptu 
party in the cabin.  The mountaineers would not be justified 
even if, unknowingly, they in fac
 the upcoming snowstorm.77 
Thus, in order to b
b ish three elements: 
 (i) the basis for the defense (actual necessity); 
 (ii) an objectively p
rms and evils); and 
 (iii) the subjective belief in the necessity of overstepping 
a prohibito
ome.78 
Similarly, to be justified for hurting someone in se
nse or defense of another, the defendant must establish: 
(i) the basis for the
nlawful attack);79 
(ii) an objectively preferable outcome (it is preferable to 
harm an aggressor rat
cent victim); and 
 
75. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 1 (1980). 
76. See id. at § 3.02 cmt. 2 (pointing out that “one who takes a life in 
order to avoid financial ruin does not act from a justifying necessity”). 
77. But see Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm 
as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 288-91 (1975) 
(arguing that claims of justification should prevail regardless of the actor’s 
state of mind). 
78. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 2 (1980) (“It is not enough that 
the actor believes that his behavior possibly may be conducive to 
ameliorating certain evils; he must believe it is ‘necessary’ to avoid the 
evils.”). 
79. The MPC is different: its self-defense provision is entirely subjective.  
As long as the actor believes his use of force to be necessary to fend off an 
unlawful attack, he is justified. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04. The actor may 
still be responsible for reckless (or negligent) homicide or injury if his beliefs 
were held recklessly (or negligently). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
BERGELSON-COCEPTUALIZING CONSENT (FOR SSRN).DOC 7/17/2008  4:21 PM 
118 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  28::4 
he may be 
excused).  Nor would he be justified if he merely used the 
alities and completely 
exon
sfied only when the subjective 
purp
another in prosecution for a reckless (or negligent) crime, if the 
 
(iii) the subjective belief in the necessity of overstepping a 
prohibitory norm in order to achieve this preferable outcome. 
If the perpetrator used force in the absence of necessity (no 
basis for defense) or injured several innocent bystanders in 
order to immobilize the aggressor (not an objectively preferable 
outcome), he would not be justified (although 
attack as a ploy to harm the aggressor (bad faith). 
The last point may be illustrated by the following example: 
suppose person A hates his enemy B and wants him dead.  
Knowing that B frequents a certain bar, A spends night after 
night outside the bar waiting for an occasion.  While he is 
waiting, he witnesses numerous fights, sexual assaults, even 
murders; however, he never interferes, until finally one day he 
sees B attacking another patron C with deadly force.  Knowing 
the law of defense of another,80 A intervenes and kills B.  At his 
trial, A honestly tells his story of patience and determination.  
Should he be rewarded for these qu
erated, even though we know that he would not have 
defended C but for his desire to kill B? 
I think most of us would view such acquittal as a mockery 
of justice.  Justification defenses are not intended to provide 
people with convenient opportunities to commit crimes.  Any 
justifiable conduct requires good faith; and, in the context of a 
limited license to overstep a prohibitory norm, the requirement 
of good faith should be sati
ose of the perpetrator is directed towards the goals for 
which that license is granted. 
Furthermore, under the MPC, the “choice of evils” is not 
available as a defense against a reckless (or negligent) crime if 
the defendant was reckless (or negligent) in bringing about the 
situation that made the injurious choice necessary.81  
Similarly, the MPC and the law of most states deny the 
perpetrator the justifications of self-defense and defense of 
80. See, e.g., id. at § 3.05. 
81. Id. at § 3.02(2).  In a number of states, the rule is even stricter: the 
defense of necessity is completely foreclosed for an actor who was at fault in 
bringing about the situation requiring the choice of harms or evils.  See id. § 
3.02 cmt. 5 n.27. 
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belief that would otherwise justify his actions was held 
recklessly (or negligently).82  Under this logic, should not a 
defendant who intentionally placed himself in a situation in 
which he would be able to use the defense of another as a cover 
up for intentional homicide be denied the defense of 
justification?  The language of the MPC certainly suggests this 
conclusion: in determining the perpetrator’s eligibility for self-
defense and related defenses, the MPC addresses only the actor 
who “believes that the use of force upon or toward the person of 
another is necessary for a
f would establish a justification.”83 
Applying the same logic to the defense of consent, we, 
therefore, should only grant complete justification to the 
perpetrator who can estab
ificatory defense, namely: 
(i) the basis for the defense (valid consent of the victim); 
(ii) an objectively p
s and evils); and 
(iii) the subjective belief in the necessity of 
m in order to achieve this preferable outcome. 
In what follows I cons
ense of Consent 
The requirement of valid consent is quite straightforward, 
at least in theory.84  To be valid, consent must be rational and 
voluntary, that is, freely given and informed.85  Consent 
obtained by duress or fraud regarding the nature of the 
perpetrator’s act is void ab initio.86  Certain groups of people 
(e.g., children, mentally ill, intoxicated), in most instances, are 
82. Id. at § 3.09. 
83. Id. at § 3.09(2) (emphasis added). 
84. For an excellent discussion of confusion between actual and legally 
vali
NAL LAW: 
HAR
: 
d consent, see WESTEN, supra note 72, at 119-24. 
85. See, e.g., 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMI
M TO SELF 316 (1986) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF]. 
86. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(d)(3), § 2.11 cmt. 3 (1980). 
87. See FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 85, at 316.  Feinberg wrote
If he is so impaired or undeveloped cognitively that he doesn’t really 
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there is a strong argument that courts should require higher 
levels of rationality and voluntariness of the victim’s decision 
as the amount of inflicted or risked harm increases.88  For 
example, simple “sure, why not?” may be sufficient to 
constitute consent for piercing—but not cutting off—one’s 
ears.89 
One could argue that, when the perpetrator, acting in good 
faith, produces a measurably positive outcome, consent of the 
victim does not matter.  This claim would be faulty.  Consider 
Gilbert v. State, in which the court convicted a seventy-five-
year-old man of first-degree murder for shooting his wife to 
death.90  Roswell and Emily Gilbert had been married for fifty-
one years.91  For the last few years of her life, Emily suffered 
from osteoporosis and Alzheimer’s disease, and her condition 
rapidly deteriorated.92  Testifying at his trial, Roswell Gilbert 
said: “‘there she was in pain and all this confusion and I guess 
if I got cold as icewater that’s what had happened.  I thought to 
myself, I’ve got to do it . . . I’ve got to end her suffering . . . .’”93  
As dramatic and sad as this case is, the appellate court was 
right to affirm the defendant’s conviction.  Roswell Gilbert was 
motivated by compassion and desire to protect his wife from 
suffering and, in fact, he did everything in his power to make 
her death as painless as possible.94  But even if her condition 
was so desperate that Roswell objectively benefited Emily by 
know what he is doing, or so impaired or undeveloped volitionally that 
he cannot help what he is doing, then no matter what expression of 
assent he may appear to give, it will lack the effect of genuine consent. 
Id.  
88. Id. at 117-21. 
89. Id. at 124-27.  Feinberg wrote: 
In the cases of “presumably nonvoluntary behavior,” what we 
“presume” is either that the actor is ignorant or mistaken about what 
he is doing, or acting under some sort of compulsion, or suffering from 
some sort of incapacity, and that if that were not the case, he would 
choose not to do what he seems bent on doing now. 
Id. at 124. 
90. Gilbert v. State, 487 So. 2d 1185, 1186-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
91. Id. at 1187. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1188 (acknowledging the defendant’s explanation that he used 
a gun because it causes instantaneous death). 
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cutting short her agony, he should not be entitled to 
justification.  Unauthorized homicide of an autonomous human 
being is, and should be, murder.  No one has the right to decide 
for another person that his life is not worth living, or, citing the 
words of the Gilbert opinio
rst degree murder.”95 
The requirement to achieve a positive balance of harms 
and evils raises a more complicated question of law and policy.  
Traditionally, criminal harm is understood as wrongful 
interference with the victim’s essential welfare interests.96  The 
interference is deemed wrongful if it violates the victim’s 
rights.  From this perspective, consensual physical harm 
presents a problem: since consent constitutes a waiver of 
rights, the perpetrator who kills or injures a willing victim does 
not violate the victim’s rights.  But can we say that cases of 
voluntary euthanasia, consensual cannibalistic killing, and 
sadomasochis
gdoing? 
In an attempt to resolve this problem, a number of scholars 
have recently suggested that the concept of criminal harm 
should not be limited to a violation of one’s autonomy.97  In 
their view, such acts as, say, consensual gladiatorial matches 
are impermissible because they violate the participants’ 
dignity, and dignity is so essential to our humanity that, in 
cases of a conflict between autonomy and dignity, the former 
ought to yield.98  For that reason,
95. Id. at 1191. 
96. JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO 
OTHERS 62 (1984).  Those include “interests in the continuance for a 
foreseeable interval of one’s life, and the interests in one’s own physical 
health and vigor, the integrity and normal functioning of one’s body, the 
absence of absorbing pain and suffering or grotesque disfigurement, minimal 
intellectual acuity, emotional stability. . . .”  Id. at 37. 
97. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Basic Values and the Victim’s State of 
Mind, 88 CAL. L. REV. 759, 769-70 (2000); Dubber, supra note 59, at 568; R.A. 
Duff, Harms and Wrongs, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 13, 39-44 (2001); R. George 
Wright, Consenting Adults: The Problem of Enhancing Human Dignity Non-
Coercively, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1397, 1399 (1995). 
98. Wright, supra note 97, at 1399; see also Dan-Cohen, supra note 97, at 
777-78; Dubber, supra note 97, at 568 (arguing that personal autonomy 
includes dignity, and that the concept of criminal harm should be based on 
protection of a person rather than a state). 
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nse to the violation of dignity. 
I share the view that certain degrading behavior may be 
wrongful even when it does not violate the victim’s rights.  
Society may be concerned about human dignity in various 
circumstances, including those in which a prohibitory norm 
does not originate in a rights violation.  Consider experiments 
conducted in the 1980s that involved the use of fresh cadavers 
as “crash dummies.”99  When those experiments became 
known, they caused public outrage.100  But why?  We usually do 
not feel offended by autopsies or postmortem organ donation.  
Perhaps, as Joel Feinberg has suggested, the answer has 
somet
In the air bag experiments cadavers were 
violently smashed to bits, whereas dissections 
are done in laboratories by white-robed medical 
technicians in spotless antiseptic rooms, 
radiating the newly acquired sy
respectability of professional medicine.101 
Or perhaps the difference is not merely symbolic, and 
violently smashing cadavers to bits is, in fact, disrespectful—
disrespectful of our only recently shared humanity?  An act of 
autopsy or removal of an organ for transplantation is not 
qualitatively different from a regular surgery.  Extracting a 
kidney, inter vivo or postmortem, does not reduce one’s moral 
status to that of a thing.  Smashing a body in an industrial 
experiment or using human remains to manufacture soap does 
have this effect.  In other words, even when an act of indignity 
is committed on an unconscious or dead body or when the 
victim does not perceive an 
gful act has been done. 
What is at stake here is people’s moral dignity, or dignity 
of personhood, as opposed to social dignity, or dignity of rank.  
Social dignity is nonessential; in a society that permits social 
99. Joel Feinberg, The Mistreatment of Dead Bodies, 15 HASTINGS 
CENTER REP. 31, 31-32 (1985). 
100. Id. at 31. 
101. Id. 
102. Dubber, supra note 59, at 535. 
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contrast, is an essential characteristic of all” human beings.103  
It is so important for our collective humanity that we extend it 
not only to those “who satisfy “the minimum requirements of 
personhood,”104 but even to those who closely miss them. 
And yet, as important as moral dignity is, its violation 
should not be criminalized lightly.  Whenever the state 
prohibits consensual behavior, for the sake of dignity or any 
other reason, it suppresses individual liberty and autonomy—
partly paternalistically, but mostly for the benefit of society at 
large. 105  Therefore, the threat to society should be serious 
enough to warrant use of criminal sanctions.  For instance, the 
careless attitude to human dignity exhibited by “Fear Factor,” 
a popular television reality show, has raised concerns of a 
number of its viewers. One journalist commented: “Do we 
really need to see people buried under 400 rats, each biting the 
exposed body parts of the desperate contestants?  No.  And it 
doesn't get any more palatable when someone yells out, ‘Keep 
your butt cheeks clenched!’”106 
It is understandable that those pictures could disturb some 
members of the public, but the nature and magnitude of the 
personal and societal harm brought about by the show did not 
rise to the level that would justify a criminal ban—that harm 
was simply “not the law’s business,”107 at least, not the 
criminal law’s business.  Anthony Duff has accurately observed 
103. See id.  Dan-Cohen makes a similar point when he observes that 
the term “dignity” should be understood as “moral worth” and not “social 
status.”  See MEIR DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS: ESSAYS ON LAW, SELF, 
AND MORALITY 169 n.23 (2002). 
104. Dubber, supra note 59, at 535. 
105. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 85, at 172. 
When B requests that A do something for (or to) him that is directly 
harmful or dangerous to B’s interests, or when the idea originates with 
A and he solicits and receives B’s permission to do that thing, then (in 
either case) B can be said to have “consented” to A’s action.  If 
nevertheless the criminal law prohibits A from acting in such cases, it 
invades B’s liberty (by preventing him from getting what he wanted 
from A) or his autonomy (by depriving his voluntary consent of its 
effect). 
106 Tim Goodman, Reality TV Hits a Tailspin with NBC's “Fear 
Factor.” SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June 11, 2001, section E-1, Final 
edition. 
107. THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION 133 (Stein & Day 1963). 
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that not punishing someone’s conduct does not mean approving 
of it; instead, that can mean the lack of standing to judge or 
condemn such conduct.108  We do not have to approve of radical 
cosmetic surgery, religious flagellation, or sadomasochistic 
brutality, however, society may be better served by not 
prosecuting those consensual activities. 
In other words, not every violation of human dignity 
deserves criminal punishment, but only such that affects 
society at large.  As I argued elsewhere, to avoid over-
criminalization yet capture the most egregious cases, the 
criminal doctrine should be revised to explicitly include dignity 
violation in the concept of wrongdoing.109  Criminal harm then 
would retain its current meaning as a wrongful setback to an 
important welfare interest, but “wrongful” would mean either 
(i) such as violates the victim’s autonomy, or (ii) such as 
violates the victim’s dignity.110  The two kinds of criminal harm 
comprise the same evil—objectification of another human 
being.  That evil may be brought about by an injury to a vital 
human interest, combined with either a rights violation (e.g., 
theft) or disregard of the victim’s dignity (e.g., consensual 
deadly torture).  The absolute majority of criminal offenses, 
being non-consensual, include both kinds of harm. 
As for consensual physical harm, it should be punishable 
only when an important welfare interest normally protected by 
criminal law is set back in a way that denies the victim his 
equal moral worth.  The recent German case in which Armin 
Meiwes killed his willing victim, Bernd Juergen Brandes, and 
then cannibalized on his flesh, may serve as an example.111  By 
killing Brandes, Meiwes did not violate Brandes’s right to life.  
However, he not only defeated the most essential interest of 
Brandes (his interest in continued living) but also used 
108. Duff, supra note 97, at 36. 
109. Bergelson, supra note 69, at 219-221. 
110. Interestingly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights makes 
this distinction quite clear when it states in Article 1: “All human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
111. See Michael Cook, Moral Mayhem of Murder on the Menu, HERALD 
SUN (Melbourne, Austl.), Jan. 15, 2004, at 17, available at 
http://www.australasianbioethics.org/Media/2004-01-16-MC-cannibal.html. 
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Brandes as an object, a means of obtaining the desired 
cannibalistic experience, and thus disregarded his dignity. 
In contrast, a consensual mercy killing of a suffering, 
terminally ill patient certainly also destroys the patient’s 
interest in continued living.  Yet, when warranted by the 
patient’s condition and motivated by compassion, such killing 
respects and preserves the dignity of the dying individual, and, 
therefore, should not be subject to criminal liability.  In 
Michigan v. Kevorkian, the state prosecuted Dr. Kevorkian for 
administering a lethal injection to a former racecar driver who, 
due to advanced Lou Gehrig’s disease, was no longer able to 
move, eat, or breathe on his own.112  Even the patient’s family 
had accepted his choice to escape the suffering and indignity of 
the slow demise.113  But not the trial court or the appellate 
court: Dr. Kevorkian was convicted of second-degree murder, 
and his conviction was affirmed.114  I suggest that these 
decisions were erroneous. 
To summarize, in order to satisfy the second requirement 
of the defense of consent, the perpetrator must establish that, 
to the extent he set back the victim’s welfare interests and, at 
the same time, disregarded the victim’s dignity, the harmful 
act nevertheless produced an objectively positive outcome.  In 
other words, the more serious (disabling and irreversible) the 
harm to the victim, the more significant the benefits of the 
injurious action must be.  A sadomasochistic beating, which 
leaves no permanent damage, should be justified by the mere 
fact that its participants desired it.  Even those who believe 
that such a beating offends the victim’s dignity would probably 
agree that it does not significantly affect the victim’s long-term 
interests.  On the other hand, only extraordinary 
circumstances might be able to justify consensual deadly 
torture. 
Finally, for complete justification, the perpetrator would 
have to establish that he not only achieved a positive balance of 
harms and evils but also intended it while causing harm.  This 
subjective requirement is particularly appropriate in the case 
112. People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291, 298 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 296. 
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of defense of consent.  Just like in cases of necessity or self-
defense, consent does not impose on the perpetrator an 
obligation to act; it merely provides him with an option.  
However, unlike necessity or a life-threatening attack, consent 
of the victim creates a very weak content-independent reason 
for action. 
When a child breaks a rule, we demand: “Why did you do 
that?”  This is a question about a moral reason for action and 
effectively about the availability of a defense.  What we want to 
know is whether the child had a good reason for violating the 
rule of conduct.  We are unlikely to accept “because such-and-
such asked me to” as a valid reason or defense.  The classic 
parental reply to that would be: “And what if he asked you to 
jump off the Brooklyn Bridge?”  By this reply, we in fact say: 
“You are a free moral agent.  Why, being a free moral agent, 
did you choose to break the rule (cause harm)?”  In the same 
sense, consent of the victim may justify the defendant only if 
the defendant had a morally sustainable reason for inflicting 
pain, injury or death. 
The proposed conceptualization of the defense of consent 
has two normative consequences.  One is that consent alone 
does not suffice to justify the victim’s death or injury; the other 
is that consent should always be at least a partial defense, 
because it defeats at least one aspect of harm, namely violation 
of rights.  A partial justification does not make a wrongful act 
right; it only makes it less wrongful compared to an identical 
but non-consensual act.  Take a lifeboat scenario, in which all 
will die, unless a few sacrifice their lives by jumping overboard.  
Assume that the necessary number of people have volunteered, 
but for whatever reason (perhaps they are too weak to be able 
to move), they cannot complete the suicidal act on their own.  
Would it be wrong to push them off?  I believe that even if it 
would be wrong, it would certainly be less wrong than 
drowning those who have not volunteered.115  It would be less 
wrong because the person who threw the victims over did not 
violate their rights.  Accordingly, he brought about less harm 
than in an identical but non-consensual act and, thus, should 
115. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 708 (1997) (making a similar 
argument). 
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deserve a lesser punishment. 
The perpetrator should be entitled only to partial 
justification if any of the following is true: 
(i) the harmful consensual act has brought about more bad 
than good (e.g., the euthanized patient was not in pain and had 
excellent prospects of recovery); 
(ii) the harmful consensual act has significantly set back 
the victim’s interests and dignity (e.g., the Meiwes-Brandes 
case of murder and cannibalism); 
(iii) the perpetrator’s conscious goal was to bring about evil 
results (e.g., killing a consenting, terminally ill patient out of 
sheer hatred for him and his family who will be financially 
ruined when he dies); or 
(iv) the perpetrator’s conscious goal was to set back 
significantly the victim’s interests and dignity (e.g., with the 
intent of injuring the victim’s body and self-esteem, hiring the 
victim for severe and humiliating beating). 
The first example is typically a case of a mistake of 
judgment.  Like any other mistake, that case should be treated 
as an instance of excuse and not justification.116  If the 
perpetrator’s mistake was reasonable, he should be completely 
exonerated from criminal punishment.  For members of the 
medical profession, it may be advisable to add a rebuttable 
presumption that, when in the course of consensual treatment 
they cause pain or injury to their patients, they act 
appropriately and in the interests of those patients, i.e., to shift 
the burden of production with respect to any alleged 
wrongdoing to the prosecution. 
The second example involves the kind of harm, which, as 
discussed above, should be prohibited by criminal law, 
irrespective of the parties’ intentions and preferences. 
The third and fourth examples involve situations in which 
the perpetrator’s reasons for causing consensual harm are 
malevolent.  Even if we assume that the perpetrator’s purpose 
was frustrated (e.g., in the third example, the terminally ill 
116. See, e.g., Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument 
for Comparative Liability in Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385, 407-08 
(2005) (discussing why mistake should be a defense of excuse and not 
justification and citing conflicting views of the issue). 
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man was spared the suffering of his final days, and his family 
found a way out of financial trouble; and, in the fourth 
example, the victim’s injuries were not particularly severe), 
still the malicious purpose, combined with the voluntary act, 
makes the perpetrator guilty.  In the third example, the 
perpetrator simply lacks a good reason necessary for 
justification: hatred does not justify intentional killing. 
In the last example (still assuming the frustration of 
purpose), the perpetrator’s wrongdoing is somewhat similar to 
an attempt.  In the case of an attempt, the perpetrator commits 
a wrongful act with a culpable state of mind, but does not bring 
about the social harm proscribed by the completed offense.  In 
an attempted murder, for instance, the perpetrator shoots with 
the purpose to kill, but misses his victim.  His act is wrongful 
because its objective is to violate the rights of the victim: people 
have a right not to be physically attacked without provocation.  
In my fourth example, the perpetrator also commits a wrongful 
act with a culpable state of mind, namely, he beats the victim 
with the purpose of causing injury to the victim’s body and 
dignity.  This act does not violate the victim’s rights because it 
is consensual.  It is nevertheless wrongful under the theory of 
harm advocated here because its objective is to damage the 
victim’s essential welfare interests and dignity.  Due to the 
wrongfulness of his purpose, the perpetrator is not entitled to 
complete justification.  Unlike the case of attempt, the 
perpetrator in the last example does cause the social harm 
proscribed by the underlying offense, yet not all of the 
proscribed harm.  Thus, he is guilty of the completed, albeit 
mitigated, offense. 
Naturally, the extent of partial justification attributed to 
the victim’s consent should depend on the facts of each case 
and, at a minimum, reflect the importance of the victim’s 
interests (both harmed and intended to be harmed), the extent 
of the actual and intended damage to the victim’s interests and 
dignity, and the actual and intended balance of harms/evils 
and benefits.  In many instances, partial justification will 
reduce the perpetrator’s punishment to the minimal level.  In 
the third example above, the perpetrator’s fault is not very 
significant.  He does not violate the victim’s dignity, and while 
destroying the victim’s interest in continued living, he 
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advances the victim’s interest in avoiding pain and suffering.  
Due to his overall evil purpose, the perpetrator does not 
deserve full justification, but this does not mean he ought to go 
to jail.  Community service or its equivalent may be much more 
appropriate.  Conversely, the perpetrator in the second 
example is guilty of a serious wrongdoing, and his partial 
justification should not translate into the same mitigation of 
punishment as the partial defense in the third example. 
IV. Conclusion 
Intentionally injuring or killing another person is 
presumptively wrong.  To overcome this presumption, the 
perpetrator must establish a defense of justification.  Consent 
of the victim may serve as one of the grounds for such a 
defense.  For complete justification, the perpetrator’s reasons 
for a consensual injurious act must be subjectively benevolent 
and the act must produce an overall positive balance of harms 
and evils, including harm to the victim’s welfare interests and 
dignity.  If these requirements are not met, the defense should 
be only partial. 
The proposed rule makes sense both theoretically and 
practically.  From the theoretical perspective, it places consent 
squarely within the family of justification defenses.  All of 
them, from self-defense to necessity, seek to overcome the 
deontological constraint against intentional infliction of harm.  
These defenses may be granted to a person who chose a certain 
course of action despite its negative effects (as opposed to for 
the sake of its negative effects) and succeeded in producing a 
better outcome.  From the practical perspective, this rule 
leaves room for balancing the harms and benefits caused by the 
perpetrator.  This is an important difference from the current 
law, which is absolute in what it allows and disallows.  Overall, 
adopting a rule based on a uniform principle common to other 
justification defenses would lead to more fair, consistent, and 
morally sustainable verdicts. 
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